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【学术报告】Inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium for selfish machine
编辑:发布时间:2020年11月17日

SpeakerProf. Wu Yong

          Ningbo University of Finance & Economics

Title: Inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium for selfish machine covering on two hierarchical uniform machines

Time25th, Nov., 2020, 16:40

Location实验楼105 (线下

Abstract:

We study the selfish scheduling game on two hierarchical uniform machines where the jobs are correspondingly classified into two hierarchical classes. The cost of a job is defined as the completion time of the machine to which it is assigned. Each selfish job is interested in minimizing its own cost, while the game seeks to meet the social objective of maximizing the machine cover. We obtain the (strong) price of anarchy and the (strong) price of stability as functions of the ratio between the speeds of the two machines s. We show that all the derived bounds are tight for any value of s, thus completely solving the problem of measuring the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium on two hierarchical uniform machines.

Speaker Introduction

吴用,男,1983年生,博士、教授、宁波财经学院教务处副处长。先后主持教育部人文社科项目1项、浙江省自然科学基金项目2项、宁波市自然科学基金项目3项、浙江省教育厅科研项目1项等。发表SSCI/SCI检索学术论文10余篇。荣获浙江省高校第九届青年教师教学技能竞赛第一名(特等奖),第三届全国高校青年教师教学竞赛第六名(二等奖)。

 

联系人:刘龙城